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Abstract
The United Kingdoms Leasehold Valuation Tribunal hears extension and
enfranchisement cases between landlords (freeholders) and tenants (leasehold-
ers). In these cases, the two parties argue about the terms of housing lease
extensions of up to 90 years in length, and about enfranchisements to convert
leasehold contracts of specic durations to perpetual ownership freeholds. The
widely-followed decisions of the leasehold valuation tribunal provide a unique in-
sight into household-level variation in expectations of long-run discount rates and
cash-ows, and set bounds on the prices that market participants may be willing
to pay for housing over long periods of time. We use the record of decisions since
1995 to extract information about long-run cash-ow and discount rate expecta-
tions in this unique setting, which requires no estimation, but has real stakes for
the participants in these negotiations. We nd evidence that the discount rate
associated with these decisions causes values of properties discounted for long
periods (above 90 years) to be close to zero.
We gratefully acknowledge the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for nancial support, John Campbell,
Ralph Koijen, and participants at the ASAP conference 2014 for useful discussions, and Shuang Zheng
for excellent research assistance.
yBadarinza: Saïd Business School, Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance, University of
Oxford, Park End Street, Oxford OX1 1HP, UK. Email cristian.badarinza@sbs.ox.ac.uk. Ramadorai:
Saïd Business School, Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance, University of Oxford, Park End
Street, Oxford OX1 1HP, UK, and CEPR. Email tarun.ramadorai@sbs.ox.ac.uk.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412296 
1 Introduction
How do economic agents discount cashows that materialize very many years into the
future? This is a central question in many areas of economics. Calculations involving
such long-run discount rates are not only important in areas of nance such as pen-
sions and insurance. They are also critical inputs into the deeply important debates
surrounding the value that society does and should place on our natural environment,
see for example Weitzman (1998), and Stern et al. (2006).
Despite the importance of long-run discounting, there is little available direct evi-
dence about the long-run discount rates that agents actually use. The available matu-
rity of long-term bonds is generally too low to extract useful evidence, and there are
few other assets that one can generally use to extract this information.
Recently, using housing market data from the U.K. and Singapore, Giglio, Maggiori,
and Stroebel (2014) ingeniously extract information on how houses leased for extremely
long periods of time are valued. Using hedonic pricing regressions, they nd that
there are valuation di¤erentials associated with the length of the leasehold term, and
attribute part of these di¤erentials to low long-run discount rates.
Our paper also utilizes information from the unique setting in the U.K. to extract
information about long-run discount rates. However, we adopt an identication ap-
proach that sidesteps some of the tricky issues that plague hedonic pricing regressions.
These issues include unobserved variation in hedonics (such as the control rights asso-
ciated with particular types of contracts) that may be correlated with the length of the
leasehold, as well as the legal framework in the U.K., which empowers leaseholders to
extend their leases using a relatively straightforward process. These issues complicate
indirect inferences about leasehold discounts, and raise the possibility of interpretation
of these discounts as control premia.
Our approach is to collate information from the U.K. Leasehold Valuation Tribunal
(LVT). The LVT is a legal dispute resolution body which hears cases in which land-
lords (freeholders) and tenants (leaseholders) argue about the precise terms for lease
extensions and collective enfranchisements. Since 1993, leaseholders have the right,
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upon payment of a premium, negotiated with the freeholder, to extend leases by up to
90 years and to engage in collective enfranchisement, by which a group of leaseholders
purchase the freehold.1
This unique setting requires no estimation, as leaseholders, freeholders, and the
LVT all provide long-run discount rate point estimates. The participants in these
negotiations also provide point estimates of valuation di¤erentials between short- and
long-term leasehold properties. These data are far better than survey data, as they
comprise real and high stakes for the participants in these negotiations.
The fact that there are lease extension and enfranchisement rights does not nec-
essarily imply that leasehold and freehold properties should be priced similarly. The
key element is that when tenants decide to extend or collectively enfranchise, they are
required to compensate the landlord in a fair fashion. If long-run discount rates are
indeed very low, the premium will be high, corresponding to the present value of future
cash ows, discounted at a low rate.
This is where the widely-followed decisions taken by the LVTs have an important
role in setting expectations in the U.K. housing market.2 Say, for example, that a
landlord discounts the future at a far lower rate than his or her tenants. The past
decisions of the LVT help to set market expectations about the level of societally
reasonable premia (and hence long-run discount rate and cash-ow expectations).
In addition, the distance between the tenants proposal and the landlords proposal
also helps to bound the tenants expected transactions costs in going to an LVT rather
than accepting the landlords proposal.
Using a record of the decisions available from the LVTs from 1995, we nd evidence
that the valuation of leasehold properties decreases substantially with the length of time
over which they are discounted. This evidence is complemented by the high discount
rates applied to per-period cash-ows, another output from the LVT data. This results
1See Appendix A for the exact wording of the relevant legislation, which is the Leasehold Reform,
Housing and Urban Development Act, and subsequent amendments.
2See Appendix B for selected press articles about legislation in this area and the role of the LVT
between 1992 and 2009. Figure A.1. shows statistics about the number of articles including the words
leasehold valuation tribunalfrom 1993 to the present listed in the major press outlets in the U.K.
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in the terminal value of properties discounted for long periods (anything after roughly
90 years) to be close to zero. We also nd intriguing evidence that the per-period
discount rate applied to cashows appears slightly positively correlated with the total
length of the term over which the discount rate is applied.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section describes the data
that we use in this study. The subsequent section describes the anatomy of a typical
leasehold extension. The fourth section discusses our results, and the nal section
concludes.
4
2 Data
To uncover household-level patterns of long-run discounting, we use information on
decisions taken by the Leasehold Valuation Tribunals across the UK. Leasehold Valu-
ation Tribunals (LVTs) were instituted by the UK Government to facilitate mediation
of disputes between the leaseholder (the tenant) and the freeholder of the property (the
landlord).
The main types of cases in which there are appeals to the Tribunal are cases of lease
extensions and collective enfranchisement. Collective enfranchisements occur when a
group of tenants get together to purchase freehold rights; as long as they fulll certain
conditions, they are entitled to do so by law. Lease extensions are cases in which
the tenant makes use of the legal right to request (and receive) an amendment of
the contract with 90 additional years added on to the leasehold. The granting of the
extension or enfranchisement is conditional on the payment of a lump sum, which is
meant to compensate the landlord for the foregone interest in the property.
Disagreements between the two parties generally concern di¤ering estimates of the
future value of the property and/or the appropriate discount rate at which to discount
future cash ows accruing to the freeholder. These disputes are settled through the
LVTs decisions.
The LVT dataset we have collected covers a sample of 460 decisions, each of which
contains expert estimates of the leasehold propertys freehold value, estimated future
sale prices, and the discount rates at which future cash ows are to be discounted back
to the present. The dispute resolution setting means that there are di¤erent assess-
ments of each of these variables across decisions, from the leaseholder, the freeholder,
and nally, the verdict from the LVT, which could be di¤erent from either of these
assessments for every one of these variables.
This dataset currently covers a subset of all LVT court decisions, from the period
between 1995 and 2006. We are in the process of updating this information to the
present day.
In Table 1, we present the main variables contained in the available text releases of
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LVT court case decisions.
In Table 2 we report a set of summary statistics pertaining to our newly compiled
dataset. Panel A shows that the number of observations varies through time, with
most cases occurring in 2005. A substantial increase in the number of cases occurs in
the year 2002, when a change in legislation was implemented through the Commonhold
and Leasehold Reform Act.
In Panel B of the table, we show that the average remaining lease term in our
sample equals 60 years and the observations range from a minimum of 2 years to a
maximum of 123 years. The discount rates used in the calculation have a mean of 8.7
percent and reach up to 13 percent, never falling below 5.3 percent. The estimated
percent valuation di¤erential between Vt;t+T2 and Vt;t+T1 decided by the LVT  the
lease discountsrange from 0 to 95.5 percent, with an average of 16.9 percent. The
minimum discount of 0 suggests that for at least one case, the 90-year lease extension
or enfranchisement does not seem to lead to an increase in the market value.
3 Anatomy of a Leasehold Extension
Henceforth, we use the following notation:
Vt;t+T1 and Vt;t+T2 Value of a leasehold at time t, of duration t+ Ti,
for lease extension of length T2   T1.
Pt+T1 and Pt+T2 Expected traded price of the freehold, at t+ Ti.
 Per-period ground rent.
r and r Discount rates for ground rent and reversion, respectively.
Typical lease extension and collective enfranchisement cases are based on the fol-
lowing implied timeline:
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Three components enter the calculation of the premium payable for a lease exten-
sion:
1. Foregone ground rent:


1  (1 + r) T1
r

2. Reversion:
Pt+T1
(1 + r)T1
  Pt+T2
(1 + r)T2
3. Marriage value:
mt;T1;T2 = Vt;t+T2 +
Pt+T2
(1 + r)T2| {z }
aggregate interests
under the new lease
 
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
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Finally, the premium payable is given by the expression:
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3.1 A specic example of a leasehold extension:
Reasons for dispute
Leaseholder Landlord LVT
Implied lease discount 5% 8% 6%
Discount rate 7% 4.5% 6.75%
Valuation
Initial term T1 78 years
Extended term T2 168 years
Value of 78-year lease Vt;t+T1 £ 208,680
Value of 168-year lease Vt;t+T2 £ 222,000
PV of ground rent £ 957
PV of deferred sale (reversion) £ 1,360
Marriage value mt;T1;T2 £ 11,004
50% of marriage value £ 5,502
Cash ows
Premium payable t;T1;T2 £ 7,818
Net gain from extending Vt;t+T2   Vt;t+T1   t;T1;T2 £ 5,502
4 Results
Figure 1 summarizes the spectrum of lease contracts in our dataset. The gure shows
the distribution of the remaining leasehold terms across the contracts subject to LVT
decisions. There is better representation of the low end of the range of terms than the
higher end, but most observations fall within the 60 to 80 year range.
Panel A of Figure 2 shows time variation in the length of the leasehold terms
about which disputes occur. There is a small tendency for disputes about short-lease
properties to have become less prevalent through time. Panel B shows that the highest
applied discount rates appear to have reduced over time, suggesting that it will be
important to control for time variation in the mean discount rate applied by the LVT.
Panel C shows that the lease discounts have been decreasing during more recent years,
which is consistent with the increase in lease terms mentioned above.
Figure 3 plots the LVT outcome discount rates against the remaining terms for
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each of the decisions. It appears that there is no tendency for the discount rate to be
negatively correlated with the remaining term of the leasehold contract. If anything,
there appears to be a slight positive correlation between the remaining term and the
per year discount rate applied to ground rent and other cash ows. This goes to the
heart of the question it does not appear from the LVT decisions as if the long-distant
future is being discounted at a lower rate than the present.
In Table 3, each year, we regress the rates r in each of the decisions on T1. In
all years, the relationship between the two is positive. The positive relationship is
very pronounced in the rst half of the sample and only weakly statistically signi-
cant towards the end. This conrms that if anything, the long-distant future is being
discounted at slightly higher rates than the short-term, in the LVT decisions.
The estimated time path of discount rates (which can be seen from the pattern of
xed e¤ects) is strongly downward-sloping, mirroring the actual evolution of nominal
interest rates in the UK during this period. In terms of the actual levels of the dis-
count rates, we observe values between 5.3 and 13 percent. Taken at face value, they
are surprisingly high and we can best describe this as a puzzle, probably reecting a
perception of a high housing .
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the remaining lease term, and the lease
discounts. Importantly, we observe a pronounced attening of this lease discount up to
a horizon of 90 years. This contrasts with the evidence from hedonic pricing regressions
uncovered by Giglio, Maggiori, and Stroebel (2014).
Table 4 reports the results from a simple linear regression of the lease discounts
on the remaining term, in which we observe that the negative relationship is robust
through time. Since our data sample is limited, we view this as reassuring evidence
about the quality and consistency of the judgements underlying the decisions of the
LVTs.
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5 Conclusions
We use the unique setting of the U.K. Leasehold Valuation Tribunal to shed light on
the important issue of long-run discounting. Using a sample of 460 decisions from the
LVT, we nd that discount rates are high, and if anything, have a slight tendency to
increase with the length of the term over which the discounting is done. The terminal
values produced by these discount rates are negatively sloping in the length of the term
over which the discounting is done, reaching zero at roughly 90 years.
This is a very preliminary draft, and in future versions, we intend to investigate
the extent to which there is disagreement between the leaseholder and the freeholder
over discount rates and valuation di¤erentials at long horizons. We also intend to use
the relationship between the per period discount rate and the valuation di¤erentials
extracted from the data to shed light on cash-ow expectations at very long horizons.
Finally, we intend to extend the data up to the most recent period, and carefully study
time-variation in the observed long-run discount rates.
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Table 1
Leasehold Valuation Tribunal court case dataset
Description Variable type Values
Court case
Case type categorical LE
CE(x)
Date of Tribunals decision ordinal (date)
Property
Address of property character string (UK format)
Postcode character string (8-digit UK format)
Lease contract
Remaining term cardinal (years)
LVT valuation assumptions
Discount rate cardinal (percent)
Marriage value cardinal (percent)
Estimated lease discount cardinal (percent)
Premium
Tenant valuation cardinal (£ )
Landlord valuation cardinal (£ )
LVT valuation cardinal (£ )
Notes:
1. LE denotes leasehold extensions.
2. CE denotes collective enfranchisement, referring to section (x) of the 1993 Act.
3. The marriage value is given as a fraction of the premium.
4. Landlords and tenants often disagree about the discount rates used in the calculation
and the lease discounts.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the variables in our dataset of LVT court cases.
Panel A Panel B
Year Obs. Freq. (%) Mean Min 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Max
1995 20 4.35 Remaining lease term (years) 60.0 2.0 13.0 50.0 65.0 76.0 87.5 123.0
1996 18 3.91 Discount rate (percent) 8.7 5.3 6.0 7.0 8.5 10.0 13.0 13.0
1997 47 10.22 Lease discount (percent) 16.9 0.0 1.9 4.8 9.1 20.0 60.0 91.5
1998 23 5.00
1999 38 8.26
2000 43 9.35
2001 33 7.17
2002 49 10.65
2003 45 9.78
2004 48 10.43
2005 69 15.00
2006 27 5.87
Total 460 100.00
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Table 3
Relationship between discount rate and remaining lease term
This table reports estimated coe¢ cients from the following regression:
ri;t =  + t + tT1;i + "i;
where i is an index of LVT lease extension court cases, ri;t is the rate used in the settlement calculation,
Ti;1 is the remaining lease term and t indicates the year during which the LVT decision was taken.
The procedure is equivalent to running a regression of discount rates on remaining terms, separately
for each year. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
t  t t
9.37 (0.79)
1995 0.024 (0.011)
1996 -2.64 (1.07) 0.052 (0.011)
1997 -1.58 (0.95) 0.038 (0.007)
1998 -2.64 (1.21) 0.062 (0.014)
1999 -2.60 (1.04) 0.034 (0.010)
2000 -2.24 (1.00) 0.033 (0.010)
2001 -3.78 (1.01) 0.050 (0.010)
2002 -3.55 (0.91) 0.044 (0.008)
2003 -3.09 (0.99) 0.029 (0.009)
2004 -2.80 (0.95) 0.022 (0.009)
2005 -2.75 (1.04) 0.019 (0.011)
2006 -4.00 (1.91) 0.033 (0.026)
R2: 50.0
number of observations: 460
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Table 4
Relationship between lease discount and remaining lease term
This table reports estimated coe¢ cients from the following regression:
discounti;t = + t + tT1;i + "i;
where i is an index of LVT lease extension court cases, T1;i is the remaining lease term and t
indicates the year during which the LVT decision was taken. discounti;t is equal to
Vt;t+T2 Vt;t+T1
Vt;t+T2
.
For example, a discount value of 5% implies that the marketable value of the property under the old
(shorter) lease is 5% less than it is expected to be under the new (longer) lease. The procedure is
equivalent to running a regression of lease discounts on remaining terms, separately for each year.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
t  t t
49.54 (4.29)
1995 -0.534 (0.062)
1996 0.00 (5.77) -0.541 (0.057)
1997 8.65 (5.12) -0.645 (0.039)
1998 11.24 (6.53) -0.749 (0.076)
1999 3.51 (5.61) -0.613 (0.053)
2000 14.56 (5.42) -0.797 (0.052)
2001 18.80 (5.45) -0.822 (0.051)
2002 22.49 (4.90) -0.932 (0.043)
2003 15.09 (5.36) -0.790 (0.051)
2004 20.68 (5.12) -0.922 (0.048)
2005 4.30 (5.63) -0.666 (0.057)
2006 6.41 (10.35) -0.685 (0.138)
R2: 84.6
number of observations: 460
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Figure 1
The distribution of remaining lease term
This gure reports the histogram of the remaining lease term corresponding to the 460 observations
we can draw upon in our LVT dataset, covering the period from 1995 to 2006.
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Figure 2
Variation through time: key variables in LVT dataset
This gure reports the time series variation of the remaining lease terms, the discount rates used in
the calculation and the implies lease discounts, from our sample of 460 LVT court case decisions.
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Figure 3
Relationship between discount rate and remaining lease term
This gure illustrates the relationship between the discount rate used in LVT court case decisions and
the remaining lease term of the property.
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Figure 4
Relationship between lease discount and remaining lease term
This gure illustrates the relationship between the leasehold discount estimated from LVT court case
decisions and the remaining lease term of the property.
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Appendix A
Legislation
Chapter 2, art. 56 of the Act3 mentions that:
Where a qualifying tenant of a at has under this Chapter a right to acquire a new lease
of the at [...], then [...] the landlord shall be bound to grant to the tenant, [...]
(a) in substitution for the existing lease, and
(b) on payment of the premium payable under Schedule 13 in respect of the grant,
a new lease of the at at a peppercorn rent for a term expiring 90 years after the
term date of the existing lease.
Schedule 13 mentions that:
The premium payable by the tenant in respect of the grant of the new lease shall be
the aggregate of:
(a) the diminution in value of the landlords interest in the tenants at [...]
(b) the landlords share of the marriage value [...]
The diminution in value of the landlords interest is the di¤erence between
(a) the value of the landlords interest in the tenants at prior to the grant of the new lease [...]
(b) the value of his interest in the at once the new lease is granted.
[T]he marriage value is the di¤erence between the following amounts, namely:
(a) the aggregate of:
(i) the value of the interest of the tenant under his existing lease
(ii) the value of the landlords interest in the tenants at prior to the grant of the new lease
[...]
(b) the aggregate of:
(i) the value of the interest to be held by the tenant under the new lease
(ii) the value of the landlords interest in the tenants at once the new lease is granted [...]
[...] Where at the relevant date the unexpired term of the tenants existing lease exceeds eighty
years, the marriage value shall be taken to be nil.
3The Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993, amended by the Commonhold
and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.
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Appendix B
UK media coverage
1. The Independent, 25 October 1992
"New legislation published last week gives leaseholders [...] the right to a new
lease which runs for 90 years longer than the existing one."
2. Financial Times, 19 May 1993
"A new concession aimed at increasing tenants rights was made by ministers
yesterday as the House of Lords continued its discussion of the governments
controversial legislation on leasehold reform."
3. The Evening Standard, 16 June 1995
"Residents of one of Londons most desirable addresses have won an important
victory in a leasehold battle against their landlord [...]. The Leasehold Valuation
Tribunal has decided that [the tenants] should be able to acquire 90-year extensions
to their leases [...]. The decision is signicant because the leases had only 43 years
left to run - a point at which they can become very di¢ cult to sell unless they
are extended. [...] As part of their deliberations, the tribunal visited the property,
which they said was in a quiet side street, wide and tree-lined, with substantial
houses set well back from the street with attractive and well-maintained front
gardens".
4. Property Week, 4 January 1996
"Leaseholder pressure group the Leasehold Enfranchisement Association (LEA)
has described the 1993 Act as cumbersome, intimidating and costly. [...] The
Act is a little over-complex and a little over-di¢ cult. But a bit of tinkering will
make it perfect. [...] [L]easehold valuation tribunals, given power under the Act
to resolve disputes on the price of freeholds or lease extensions, have only delivered
14 decisions."
5. Financial Tiimes, 24 February 1996
"It will soon be easier for people who own their at or house on a lease to buy it
outright. A package of measures to strengthen leaseholdersrights is due to come
into force in June following last minute amendments to the housing bill."
6. Financial Times, 16 October 1996
"[. . . ] around 6,000 leaseholders have already taken advantage of the 1993 act to
embark on a lease extension or to buy their freehold. [...] Around 95% of cases
are being settled through negotiation between the landlord and the leaseholders. A
fraction of those that have become deadlocked have gone before leasehold valuation
tribunals, the dispute resolution bodies. Their rulings have set clear precedents on
the complicated process of valuing leaseholds and freeholds which are now being
followed in private negotiations."
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7. M2 Presswire, 21 August 2000
"A new scheme for the ownership of ats and other interdependent housing units,
and a range of measures to improve the rights and conditions of leaseholders in
England and Wales is published today in a draft Government Bill and consultation
paper."
8. The Guardian, 2 March 2002
"Over the next few weeks, new measures aimed at helping 2m leaseholders through-
out England and Wales will nally become law. One way out is to club together
with others in your block to buy the freehold. Leaseholders have had the right to
take over freeholds and extend leases through the courts since 1993, and in 1996
new laws brought in Leasehold Valuation Tribunals [...] aiming to make this sim-
pler and cheaper and to allow leaseholders to dispute service charges. But LVTs
have been much criticised for being slow, expensive and inconsistent. The new bill
aims to improve LVTs, giving them a wider remitand streamlined procedures".
9. Estates Gazette, 24 September 2005
"Criticism has mounted of the valuation determinations by the Leasehold Valua-
tion Tribunals (LVT) when settling disputes between freeholders and lessees about
the price to be paid for a freehold or lease extension. There have been suggestions
that LVT decisions are pro-tenant and that decisions are typically closer to tenant
valuations. [...] The judgments owing from the ve [...] cases, expected soon
from the Lands Tribunal, should help to inform the debate on honest and realistic
reversion yields."
10. Estates Gazette Interactive, 21 September 2006
"The Lands Tribunal has provided denitive guidance on the deferment rate that
valuers should use to calculate the amount that leaseholders pay for freeholds.
[...] After hearing evidence from valuers and economists over eight days, [the]
President of the Lands Tribunal, said that unless compelling evidence to the
contrary is adduced the deferment rate would be 4.75% for houses and 5% for
ats."
11. The Times, 22 September 2006
"Buying a short-lease property could place Mayfair within reach. [...] The trick
is to buy a property with a short lease - generally dened as one with fewer than
40 years to run. [...] An extension to the lease would probably cost in the region
of 20 per cent of the purchase price."
12. The Times, 1 January 2009
"The Lords ruled unanimously that tenants planning to extend their leases or
purchase the freehold of a leasehold house will not be subject to landlordsclaims
that "hope value" (the potential uplift in price caused by a special purchaser, such
as a tenant, making a bid in the future) should be added to the price. [This
decision] claried a number of valuation issues in this complex area of the law.
It is good news for most tenants wishing to purchase the freehold of a leasehold
house or to extend their lease as they will now have to pay less for their freehold
or lease extension."
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Figure A.1
National and local media outlets covering LVTs
This gure reports the number of articles in UK-based media outlets which contain the words "lease-
hold valuation tribunal" in their headline or text content. The source of the data is Dow Joness
Factiva news service. The search query was run on April 4, 2014. Factiva covers the majority of
UK-based print newspapers and an increasing share of electronic media. The numbers we report may
subsequently be adjusted, reecting Factivas changes in the classication of media categories and the
addition of new content coverage. In Panel A, we calculate the total number of articles in each year
and in Panel B we report a disaggregated view of media coverage, by media outlet, for the period
between January 1993 and December 2013.
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Birmingham Post 
The Journal, Newcastle
East London Guardian
South Wales Echo
M2 Presswire
Daily Mail
COI News Distribution Service
Sunday Express
PR Newswire
The Mail on Sunday
Manchester Evening News
Mondaq Business Briefing
Estates Gazette Interactive
The Telegraph
The Observer
Financial Times
Estates Gazette
London Evening Standard
Electronics Weekly
The Guardian
The Independent
Property Week
The Times
Total number of articles between 1993 and 2013
22
